The Polynomial-IOP Vision of the Latest MPCitH Frameworks for Signature Schemes

Thibauld Feneuil

Post-Quantum Cryptography Trimester - Second Workshop

November 8, 2024, IHP Paris




Table of Contents

- Introduction
- The TCitH and VOLEitH frameworks, in the PIOP formalism
 - Polynomial IOP
 - Committing to polynomials
- Building signatures
- Conclusion

Introduction

How to build signature schemes?


Hash & Sign



- Short signatures
- "Trapdoor" in the public key


How to build signature schemes?

Hash & Sign



- Short signatures
- "Trapdoor" in the public key


From an identification scheme




- Large(r) signatures
- Short public key

How to build signature schemes?


Hash & Sign



- Short signatures
- "Trapdoor" in the public key




Identification Scheme




- Completeness: Pr[verif ✓ I honest prover] = 1
- Soundness: Pr[verif ✓ | malicious prover] $\leq \varepsilon$ (e.g. 2^{-128})
- Zero-knowledge: verifier learns nothing on 0-.

Identification Scheme



m: message to sign

- [IKOS07] Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai: "Zero-knowledge from secure multiparty computation" (STOC 2007)
- Turn a *multiparty computation* (MPC) into an identification scheme / zero-knowledge proof of knowledge



- **Generic**: can be applied to any cryptographic problem

- [IKOS07] Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai: "Zero-knowledge from secure multiparty computation" (STOC 2007)
- Convenient to build (candidate) **post-quantum signature** schemes
- **Picnic**: submission to NIST (2017)


- [IKOS07] Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai: "Zero-knowledge from secure multiparty computation" (STOC 2007)
- Convenient to build (candidate) **post-quantum signature** schemes
- **Picnic**: submission to NIST (2017)
- First round of additional NIST call: 7~9 MPCitH schemes / 40 candidates

AIMer Biscuit FAEST MIRA MIRA SDitH


- [IKOS07] Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai: "Zero-knowledge from secure multiparty computation" (STOC 2007)
- Convenient to build (candidate) **post-quantum signature** schemes
- **Picnic**: submission to NIST (2017)
- First round of additional NIST call: 7~9 MPCitH schemes / 40 candidates
- Second round of recent NIST call: 5~6 MPCitH schemes / 14 candidates


FAEST PERK
Mirath RYDE
MQOM SDitH

MPC-in-the-Head Paradigm





MPC-in-the-Head Paradigm







MPC-in-the-Head Paradigm









MPC-in-the-Head Paradigm Can be interpreted as Polynomial IOP (Interactive Oracle Proof) JOIR TRIPCT YES Sublinear Arguments Of Knowledge 140501 114B00CX11 THIS BEST POSTERS

The TCitH and VOLEitH Frameworks

(for signature schemes)

[FR23] Feneuil, Rivain. Threshold Computation in the Head: Improved Framework for Post-Quantum Signatures and Zero-Knowledge Arguments. ePrint 2023/1573. [BBD+23] Baum, Braun, Delpech, Klooß, Orsini, Roy, Scholl. Publicly Verifiable Zero-Knowledge and Post-Quantum Signatures From VOLE-in-the-Head. Crypto 2023.

(for signature schemes)

I know $w_1, ..., w_n$ such that

$$f(w_1, ..., w_n) = 0$$


where f is a public **degree**-d **polynomial**.

Prover



(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$




<u>Prover</u>

<u>Verifier</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$



Prover

(for signature schemes)

- 1 For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

 $Com(P_1, ..., P_n)$ Q


Well-defined!

$$f(P_1(0), ..., P_n(0)) = f(w_1, ..., w_n) = 0$$

Prover

(for signature schemes)


- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- \bigcirc Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



<u>Prover</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- \bigcirc Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- 6 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = f(v_1, ..., v_n)$$


Prover

(for signature schemes)

For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. We have

$$f(P_1(0), ..., P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 3 Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that $X \cdot Q(X) \neq f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



Soundness Analysis

- Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 6 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = f(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

Malicious Prover 0




(for signature schemes)

For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. We have

$$f(P_1(0), ..., P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that $X \cdot Q(X) \neq f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Soundness Analysis



- 4 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 6 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = f(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

Malicious Prover 0




(for signature schemes)

1 For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. We have

$$f(P_1(0), ..., P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ③ Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that $X \cdot Q(X) \neq f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

Soundness Analysis



- 4 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- **Schwartz-Zippel Lemma**: Let P be a non-zero polynomial of degree μ . We have

$$\Pr\left[P(r) = 0 \mid r \leftarrow_{\$} S\right] \le \frac{\mu}{|S|}.$$

Since $X \cdot Q(X) - f(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$ is a degree- $(d \cdot \ell)$ polynomial, we have

$$\Pr[\text{verification passes}] \le \frac{d \cdot \ell}{|S|}.$$

6 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = f(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

(for signature schemes)

I know $w_1, ..., w_n$ such that

$$f(w_1, ..., w_n) = 0$$

where f is a public **degree**-d **polynomial**.

Prover

Prove it!

<u>Verifier</u>

Soundness Error =
$$\frac{d \cdot \ell}{|S|}$$

Probability that a malicious prover can convince the verifier.

(for signature schemes)

I know $w_1, ..., w_n$ such that

$$\begin{cases} f_1(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0 \\ \vdots \\ f_m(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0, \end{cases}$$

where $f_1, ..., f_m$ are public **degree**-d **polynomials**.

Prove it!

Prover

<u>Verifier</u>


(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 3 Reveal the polynomials $Q_1(X), ..., Q_m(X)$ such that

$$X \cdot Q_1(X) = f_1(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$$

 \vdots
 $X \cdot Q_m(X) = f_m(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

 \bigcirc Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- 6 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that
$$r \cdot Q_1(r) = f_1(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

$$...$$

$$r \cdot Q_m(r) = f_m(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

Prover


(for signature schemes)

- 1 For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 4 Reveal the polynomials $Q_1(X), ..., Q_m(X)$ such that

$$X \cdot Q_1(X) = f_1(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$$

 \vdots
 $X \cdot Q_m(X) = f_m(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- \bigcirc Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 7 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

$$r \cdot Q_1(r) = f_1(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

$$r \cdot Q_m(r) = f_m(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

<u>Prover</u>


(for signature schemes)

- 1 For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 4 Reveal the polynomials $Q_1(X), ..., Q_m(X)$ such that

$$X \cdot Q_1(X) = f_1(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$$

 \vdots
 $X \cdot Q_m(X) = f_m(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- 5 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 7 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

$$r \cdot Q_1(r) = f_1(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

$$r \cdot Q_m(r) = f_m(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$


Prover

Costly!

Solution: batching

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$




<u>Prover</u>

<u>Verifier</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$




③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$

Prover

<u>Verifier</u>

(for signature schemes)

- 1 For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$



3 Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$


Well-defined!

Prover

$$\sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(0), \dots, P_n(0)) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(w_1, \dots, w_n)$$
$$= \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot 0 = 0$$

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- **6** Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.




- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$

Prover

<u>Verifier</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

Prover

Verifier


(for signature schemes)

① For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. There exists j^* s.t.

$$f_{j*}(P_1(0),...,P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- 4 Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that $X \cdot Q(X) \neq \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
 - 6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Soundness Analysis



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

<u>Verifier</u>

(for signature schemes)

① For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. There exists j^* s.t.


$$f_{j*}(P_1(0),...,P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that

$$X \cdot Q(X) \neq \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), \dots, P_n(X))$$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Soundness Analysis



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 7 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

It is an inequality with **high probability** over the randomness of $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m$, since we have

$$\sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(0), \dots, P_n(0)) \neq 0$$

Malicious Prover **5**

(for signature schemes)

① For all i, choose a degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$. There exists j^* s.t.


$$f_{j*}(P_1(0),...,P_n(0)) \neq 0.$$

- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X). We know that

$$X \cdot Q(X) \neq \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), \dots, P_n(X))$$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Soundness Analysis



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 7 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.

Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, ..., v_n)$$

<u>Verifier</u>


Schwartz-Zippel Lemma: Since it is a degree- $(d \cdot \ell)$ relation,

$$\Pr[\text{verification passes}] \le \frac{d \cdot \ell}{|S|}.$$

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ① Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- **6** Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Zero-Knowledge Analysis



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment. Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, ..., v_n)$$


<u>Verifier</u>

<u>Prover</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- 2 Commit the polynomials $P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
- 6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Zero-Knowledge Analysis



- 3 Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- 5 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- 7 Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment. Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$


Verifier ••

Revealing an evaluation of $P_i(X)$ leaks no information about w_i .

(for signature schemes)

- For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$
- 2 Commit the polynomials P_1, \ldots, P_n
- 4 Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = \sum_{i} \gamma_{i} \cdot f_{i}(P_{1}(X), \dots, P_{n}(X))$
- 6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Zero-Knowledge Analysis



- 3 Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- 5 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment. Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

Verifier ••



 \triangle Leak information about the witness $w_1, ..., w_n$


(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$ Sample a random degree- $(d\ell-1)$ polynomial $P_0(X)$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_0, P_1, ..., P_n$
- 4 Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that

$$X \cdot Q(X) = X \cdot P_0(X) + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.

Zero-Knowledge Analysis



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment. Check that

$$r \cdot Q(r) = r \cdot v_0 + \sum_{j=1}^m \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$


Verifier ••

Prover

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$ Sample a random degree- $(d\ell-1)$ polynomial $P_0(X)$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_0, P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = X \cdot P_0(X) + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$

6 Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.



- ③ Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment. Check that


$$r \cdot Q(r) = r \cdot v_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$

Verifier

<u>Prover</u>

(for signature schemes)

- ① For all i, sample a random degree- ℓ polynomial $P_i(X)$ such that $P_i(0) = w_i$ Sample a random degree- $(d\ell-1)$ polynomial $P_0(X)$
- ② Commit the polynomials $P_0, P_1, ..., P_n$
- ④ Reveal the polynomial Q(X) such that $X \cdot Q(X) = X \cdot P_0(X) + \sum_{j=1}^m \gamma_j \cdot f_j(P_1(X), ..., P_n(X))$
 - **6** Reveal the evaluation $v_i := P_i(r)$ for all i.




- 3 Choose random coefficients $\gamma_1, ..., \gamma_m \leftarrow^{\$} \mathbb{F}$
- 5 Choose a random evaluation point $r \in S \subset \mathbb{F}$
- \bigcirc Check that $v_1, ..., v_n$ are consistent with the commitment.


Check that


$$r \cdot Q(r) = r \cdot v_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \gamma_j \cdot f_j(v_1, \dots, v_n)$$


Verifier


<u>Prover</u>











Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values $r_1, ..., r_N$ and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Commitment:

We commit to each value r_i independently.

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Commitment:

We commit to each value r_i independently.

Opening $P(e_{i*})$:

Reveal all $\{r_i\}_{i\neq i^*}$.

$$\begin{split} P(e_{i^*}) &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) + r_{i^*} \cdot \underbrace{R_{i^*}(e_{i^*})}_{=0} \\ &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) \end{split}$$

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Commitment:

We commit to each value r_i independently.

Opening $P(e_{i*})$:

Reveal all $\{r_i\}_{i\neq i^*}$.

The opening leaks nothing about P, except $P(e_{i^*})$.

$$\begin{split} P(e_{i^*}) &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) + r_{i^*} \cdot \underbrace{R_{i^*}(e_{i^*})}_{=0} \\ &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) \end{split}$$

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Commitment:

We commit to each value r_i independently.

Opening $P(e_{i*})$:

Reveal all $\{r_i\}_{i\neq i^*}$.

The opening leaks *nothing* about P, except $P(e_{i^*})$.

Can be adapted to any degree.

$$\begin{split} P(e_{i^*}) &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) + r_{i^*} \cdot \underbrace{R_{i^*}(e_{i^*})}_{=0} \\ &= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) \end{split}$$

Public data: Let us

- have N distinct values $e_1, ..., e_N$, and
- define R_i such that $R_i(0) = 1$ and $R_i(e_i) = 0$, for all i in $\{1, ..., N\}$.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P. We sample N values r_1, \ldots, r_N and define P as

$$P := \sum_{i} r_{i} \cdot R_{i}.$$

Costly!

Correctness:

If $N \ge 2$, P is a random degree-1 polynomial.

Commitment:

We commit to each value r_i independently.

Opening $P(e_{i^*})$: Reveal all $\{r_i\}_{i\neq i^*}$.

The opening leaks *nothing* about P, except $P(e_{i^*})$.


Can be adapted to any degree.


$$P(e_{i^*}) = \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*}) + r_{i^*} \cdot \underbrace{R_{i^*}(e_{i^*})}_{=0}$$


$$= \sum_{i \neq i^*} r_i \cdot R_i(e_{i^*})$$


[GGM84] Goldreich, Goldwasser, Micali: "How to construct random functions (extended extract)" (FOCS 1984)


 $r_1 \qquad r_2 \qquad r_3 \qquad \dots \qquad r_{N-1} \qquad r_N$











We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P such that P(0) = w.

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P such that P(0) = w.

- 1. Sample and commit a random degree-1 polynomial $ilde{P}$
- **2.** Reveal $\Delta w := w \tilde{P}(0)$
- **3.** Define P as $P(X) := \tilde{P} + \Delta w$

We want to build and commit a random degree-1 polynomial P such that P(0) = w.

- 1. Sample and commit a random degree-1 polynomial $ilde{P}$
- **2.** Reveal $\Delta w := w \tilde{P}(0)$
- 3. Define P as $P(X) := \tilde{P} + \Delta w$

To open $P(e_{i^*})$ for $i^* \in \{1,\dots,N\}$, we just need to open $\tilde{P}(e_{i^*})$ and to compute

$$P(e_{i^*}) \leftarrow \tilde{P}(e_{i^*}) + \Delta w.$$

Complexity in O(N) to have a soundness error of $\frac{d}{N}$ (degree-1 polynomials).

How to have a negligible soundness error?



Complexity in O(N) to have a soundness error of $\frac{d}{N}$ (degree-1 polynomials).

How to have a negligible soundness error?



1. Taking $N \ge 2^{\lambda}$. Impossible since the complexity would be in $O(2^{\lambda})$.

Committing to a Polynomial using a Seed Tree

Complexity in O(N) to have a soundness error of $\frac{d}{N}$ (degree-1 polynomials).

How to have a negligible soundness error?



- 1. Taking $N \ge 2^{\lambda}$. Impossible since the complexity would be in $O(2^{\lambda})$.
- 2. <u>TCitH-GGM Approach</u>. Taking N small (e.g. N=256) and repeating the protocol τ times. Soundness error of $\left(\frac{d}{N}\right)^{\tau}$.

Committing to a Polynomial using a Seed Tree

Complexity in O(N) to have a soundness error of $\frac{d}{N}$ (degree-1 polynomials).

How to have a negligible soundness error?



- 1. Taking $N \geq 2^{\lambda}$. Impossible since the complexity would be in $O(2^{\lambda})$.
- 2. <u>TCitH-GGM Approach</u>. Taking N small (e.g. N=256) and repeating the protocol τ times. Soundness error of $\left(\frac{d}{N}\right)^{\tau}$.
- 3. <u>VOLEitH Approach</u>. Embed τ polynomials over \mathbb{F}_q into a unique polynomial over \mathbb{F}_{q^τ} , for which we will be able to open N^τ evaluations. Soundness error of $\frac{d}{N^\tau}$.

Building Signatures

Building Signatures

I know $w_1, ..., w_n$ such that

$$\begin{cases} f_1(w_1, \dots, w_n) &= 0 \\ \vdots \\ f_m(w_1, \dots, w_n) &= 0, \end{cases}$$

where $f_1, ..., f_m$ are public **degree**-d **polynomials**.

Prove it!

Prover

<u>Verifier</u>

Building Signatures

I know $w_1, ..., w_n$ such that

$$\begin{cases} f_1(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0 \\ \vdots \\ f_m(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0, \end{cases}$$

where $f_1, ..., f_m$ are public **degree**-d **polynomials**.

Fiat-Shamir Transformation



Prove it!

Verifier

Building Signature Schemes

The **public key** is composed of the **degree**-d **polynomials** $f_1, ..., f_m$.

The **private key** is the **witness** $w := (w_1, ..., w_n)$ that satisfies

$$\begin{cases} f_1(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0, \\ \vdots \\ f_m(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0. \end{cases}$$

Building Signature Schemes

The **public key** is composed of the **degree**-d **polynomials** $f_1, ..., f_m$.

The **private key** is the **witness** $w := (w_1, ..., w_n)$ that satisfies

$$\begin{cases} f_1(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0, \\ \vdots \\ f_m(w_1, ..., w_n) &= 0. \end{cases}$$

When $f_1, ..., f_n$ are random degree-2 polynomials,

Signature relying on the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem

[FR23] Feneuil, Rivain. Threshold Computation in the Head: Improved Framework for Post-Quantum Signatures and Zero-Knowledge Arguments. ePrint 2023/1573.

[BBM+24] Baum, Beullens, Mukherjee, Orsini, Ramacher, Rechberger, Roy, Scholl. One Tree to Rule Them All: Optimizing GGM Trees and OWFs for Post-Quantum Signatures. Asiacrypt 2024.

Building Signature Schemes

Proving that the private key $(L,R) \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times r} \times \mathbb{F}^{r \times m}$ satisfies

$$y - Hx = 0$$
 with $x = \text{vectorialize}(L \cdot R)$

where (H, y) is the public key.

Signature relying on the MinRank problem

[BFG+24] Bidoux, Feneuil, Gaborit, Neveu, Rivain. Dual Support Decomposition in the Head: Shorter Signatures from Rank SD and MinRank. Asiacrypt 2024.

Signature Sizes with the New Frameworks

	NIST Submission		New frameworks + Opt.*	
Security Assumptions	Candidate Name	Sizes	Sizes	
AES Block cipher	FAEST	4.6 KB	≈ 4.1-4.5 KB	
AIM Block cipher	AlMer	3.8 KB	≈ 3.0 KB	
MinRank	MiRitH, MIRA	5.6 KB	≈ 2.9-3.1 KB	
Multivariate Quadratic	MQOM	6.3 KB	≈ 2.5-3.0 KB	
Permuted Kernel	PERK	5.8 KB	≈ 3.6 KB	
Rank Syndrome Decoding	RYDE	6.0 KB	≈ 2.9 KB	
Structured MQ	Biscuit	5.7 KB	≈ 3.0 KB	
Syndrome Decoding	SDitH	8.3 KB	≈ 3.9 KB	

Running times of few ten millions of cycles.

^{* [}BBM+24] Baum, Beullens, Mukherjee, Orsini, Ramacher, Rechberger, Roy, Scholl. One Tree to Rule Them All: Optimizing GGM Trees and OWFs for Post-Quantum Signatures. Asiacrypt 2024.

Comparison with the PQC State of the Art

	MPCitH	Dilithium/ML-DSA	Falcon/FN-DSA	SPHINCS+
Signature Sizes	2.5-4.5 KB	2.4 KB	0.7 KB	7.8-17 KB
Pk Sizes	< 0.2 KB	1.3 KB	0.9 KB	< 0.1 KB
lSigl+lPKl	2.5-4.6 KB	3.7 KB	1.6 KB	7.9-17 KB
Sign. Time	~ (few ms)	++	++	-
Verif. Time	~ (few ms)	++	++	~
Security	AES Unstructured SD Unstructured MQ	Structured Lattice	Structured Lattice	Hash

- MPC-in-the-Head
 - A practical tool to build *conservative* signature schemes
 - Second round of the additional NIST call:
 - 6 MPCitH-based schemes among 14 candidates
 - Latest frameworks: VOLEitH and TCitH
 - Can be interpreted as Polynomial IOP (Interactive Oracle Proof)

- MPC-in-the-Head
 - A practical tool to build *conservative* signature schemes
 - Second round of the additional NIST call:

6 MPCitH-based schemes among 14 candidates

- Latest frameworks: VOLEitH and TCitH
 - Can be interpreted as Polynomial IOP (Interactive Oracle Proof)
- Perspectives:
 - Second-round submission packages (short-term)

MPC-in-the-Head

- A practical tool to build *conservative* signature schemes
- Second round of the additional NIST call:

6 MPCitH-based schemes among 14 candidates

- Latest frameworks: VOLEitH and TCitH
 - Can be interpreted as Polynomial IOP (Interactive Oracle Proof)

Perspectives:

- Second-round submission packages (short-term)
- Signatures with advanced functionalities (middle-term)

ring signatures, threshold signatures, blind signatures, multi-signatures, ...

MPC-in-the-Head

- A practical tool to build *conservative* signature schemes
- Second round of the additional NIST call:

6 MPCitH-based schemes among 14 candidates

- Latest frameworks: VOLEitH and TCitH
 - Can be interpreted as Polynomial IOP (Interactive Oracle Proof)

Perspectives:

- Second-round submission packages (short-term)
- Signatures with advanced functionalities (middle-term)

ring signatures, threshold signatures, blind signatures, multi-signatures, ...

Thank you for your attention.