

# CRY.ME : un challenge de cryptographie sur une messagerie sécurisée

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<sup>1</sup> ANSSI, <sup>2</sup> CryptoExperts


GDR Sécurité Informatique - 28 juin 2023

# Designing CRY.ME (CRYptographic MEssaging application)

# Why CRY.ME?

## ANSSI - French certification center

- Implements the certification scheme
- Licenses the ITSEFs (Information Technology Security Evaluation Facilities) which conduct the evaluations
- Supervises the evaluation projects



# Why CRY.ME?

2022: CRY.ME challenge for all ITSEFs and only for cryptographic analysis

- Cryptographic analysis compliant to ANSSI's procedures<sup>1,2</sup>
  - Theoretical analysis: review of the specifications
    - Choice of the primitives, design of the protocols, key management
  - Validation of the implementation:
    - Conformity of the implementation
    - Advanced analysis of the code

<sup>1</sup> ANSSI-CC-CRY-P-01 : [https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/11/anssi-cc-cry-p-01-modalites-pour-la-realisation-des-analyses-cryptographiques\\_v4.1.pdf](https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/11/anssi-cc-cry-p-01-modalites-pour-la-realisation-des-analyses-cryptographiques_v4.1.pdf)

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# Challenge Design

- Cryptographic analysis compliant to ANSSI's procedures<sup>1,2</sup>
- Test vehicle common to all ITSEFs (software and hardware) but not only

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  - **Open-source software product**

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# Challenge Design

- Cryptographic analysis compliant to ANSSI's procedures<sup>1,2</sup>
- Test vehicle common to all ITSEFs (software and hardware) but not only
  - **Open-source software product**
- Cover vulnerabilities of different types and levels of difficulty
  - **Several types of vulnerabilities:** conformance, symmetric crypto, asymmetric crypto, random number generation, protocols, implementation
  - **Three levels of difficulty:** not necessarily the same difficulty for identification and exploitation
  - **Various sources of errors:** weak choice of algorithms, design and/or implementation errors, differences between specifications and implementation, etc.

<sup>1</sup> ANSSI-CC-CRY-P-01 : [https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/11/anssi-cc-cry-p-01-modalites-pour-la-realisation-des-analyses-cryptographiques\\_v4.1.pdf](https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/11/anssi-cc-cry-p-01-modalites-pour-la-realisation-des-analyses-cryptographiques_v4.1.pdf)

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
# CRY.ME « Element » Application



# Why Element?

- Open-source Android application
- Integrates Matrix end-to-end encryption
- Integrates secure data backup
- Supports group conversations
- Convenient code modification and navigation (Yubikey integration, ...)
- Easy-to-use Interface
- No external dependencies besides matrix android SDK

# Architecture



## Functionalities


- Create account
- Login / Logout
- Send / Receive messages (1-to-1 or group)
- Send / Receive attachments
- Secure backup storage on the server
- Out-of-band verification between users

# Github Repo


- Open-source code: <https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/cry-me>
- **Modified** Element code with/without vulnerability comments
- Server code running in a Docker container
- Emulator code running on a desktop and handling authentication keys and server connections
- Documents (in French) describing security specifications and targets

# Challenge Setup

# Setup of Different Layers




# Cryptographic Protocols




- Goal: provide a complete comprehensive description from both sources for each protocol

# Implementation of Cryptographic Primitives

- Matrix uses Olm SDK, implementing all crypto. algorithms
- CRY.ME: re-implementing all crypto. algorithms from scratch
- Process must ensure application's functionality



# Integration of Vulnerabilities






# Server Setup

- 3-layer architecture
- Nginx
  - handles TLS
- Synapse
  - handles app. functionalities
- PostgreSQL
  - handles database

*A Docker container with the server setup is available in the git repository.*

# Vulnerabilities

# Vulnerabilities



# Choice of Cryptographic Primitives

	Original library	New library
Symmetric encryption	AES, RC4, Blowfish, ROT-13, DES	AES
Hash	SHA256, MD2, MD5, SHA1	SHA1, <b>SHA3</b>
Mac	HMAC	HMAC
Key derivation	HKDF	<b>PBKDF2</b> , HKDF
Key exchange	ECDH on Curve25519	ECDH on <b>Wei25519</b>
Signature	Ed25519	<b>RSA, Wei25519</b>
Pseudo-random generator	Java built-in secure PRG	<b>ECC PRG</b>

# Example 1: AES-256

## ■ Pseudocode from FIPS 197 standard

```
Cipher(byte in[4*Nb], byte out[4*Nb], word w[Nb*(Nr+1)])
begin
  byte state[4,Nb]

  state = in

  AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1])           // See Sec. 5.1.4

  for round = 1 step 1 to Nr-1
    SubBytes(state)                       // See Sec. 5.1.1
    ShiftRows(state)                      // See Sec. 5.1.2
    MixColumns(state)                     // See Sec. 5.1.3
    AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1])
  end for

  SubBytes(state)
  ShiftRows(state)
  AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1])

  out = state
end
```

$Nb = 4, Nr = 14$

# Example 1: AES-256

## ■ CRY.ME implementation

```
243 // --- AES BLOCK FUNCTIONS
244 // -----
245
246 void aes256_encrypt(const BYTE in[], BYTE out[], const WORD exp_key[])
247 {
248     BYTE state[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
249     int r;
250
251     // init state
252     memcpy(state, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
253
254     add_round_key(state, exp_key);
255
256     for(r=0; r<NB_ROUNDS; r++)
257     {
258         sub_bytes(state);
259         shift_rows(state);
260         mix_columns(state);
261         add_round_key(state, exp_key+r*4);
262     }
263
264     sub_bytes(state);
265     shift_rows(state);
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268     // output final state
269     memcpy(out, state, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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**Incorrect output on test vectors!**

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**Incorrect output on test vectors!**




# Example 1: AES-256


- AES implementation that does not respect the standard
  - Type: conformity issue
  - Identification: **easy**
  - Exploitation: impossible

# Example II: PBKDF2


- PBKDF2 generates key for secret storage, using a passphrase



I - select option for passphrase




II - choose passphrase



III - backup successfully generated

# Example II: PBKDF2



# Example II: PBKDF2

- PBKDF2 implementation in C
- $2^{20}$  iterations

```
68  /** default number of iterations for pbkdf2 algorithm */  
69  #define DEFAULT_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS (1 < 20)
```

# Example II: PBKDF2

- PBKDF2 implementation in C
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68  /** default number of iterations for pbkdf2 algorithm */  
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```

= 1

should have been (1 << 20)

Developer error!

# Example II: PBKDF2

- Somewhere in PBKDF2 implementation ...

```
60     for(uint32_t i = 1; i<(l+1); i++){
61         get_four_bytes(i, S_concat+salt_length);
62
63         compute_hmac(sha_type, password, 4, S_concat, salt_length+4, T);
64         memcpy(U, T, hlen*sizeof(uint8_t));
65
66         for(uint32_t k=1; k<c; k++){
67             compute_hmac(sha_type, password, 4, U, hlen, U);
68
69             for(uint32_t j = 0; j< hlen; j++){
70                 T[j] ^= U[j];
71             }
72         }
73
74         if(i == l){
75             memcpy(DK + ((i-1)*hlen), T, r*sizeof(uint8_t));
76         }else{
77             memcpy(DK + ((i-1)*hlen), T, hlen*sizeof(uint8_t));
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79     }
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
Uses only 4 bytes of the password!

# Example II: PBKDF2


- 2 vulnerabilities leading to an exploitable attack on secure backup storage
- Brute force search for the secret key with  $2^{32}$  possible passwords
  - Type: implementation bug
  - Identification: **medium**
  - Exploitation: **easy**



# Example III: RSA Signature



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


- Relies on RSA-512

```
17 #define RSA_ACCREDITATION_MOD_LENGTH 64
18 #define RSA_ACCREDITATION_HASH_LENGTH 20
```

- Factorisation takes ~10 days using a common laptop
- Impersonates server's identity

# Example III: RSA Signature



## ■ Rely on RSA-512

```
17 #define RSA_ACCREDITATION_MOD_LENGTH 64
18 #define RSA_ACCREDITATION_HASH_LENGTH 20
```

- Type: asymmetric encryption
- Identification: **medium**
- Exploitation: **medium**

■ Factorisation takes ~10 days using a common laptop

■ Impersonates server's identity

# Conclusion

- Many **cryptographic vulnerabilities** to find
- **Open-source** material with a guided tutorial
  - <https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/cry-me>
- The challenge serves as a tool for **learning purposes** on
  - the impact of cryptographic vulnerabilities on a known messaging application
  - how to detect them
  - if and how to exploit them

# Questions ?

ANSI-FR / cry-me Private Unwatch 3

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Jérémy Jean Initial commit. b78r1ar 10 minutes ago 1 commit

cryme_app	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
cryme_app_emulation	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
cryme_docs	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
cryme_server	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
.gitignore	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
LICENSE	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
README.md	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
README_ANDROID_STUDIO.md	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
README_CRYME.md	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago
demo.mp4	Initial commit.	10 minutes ago

README.md

## CRY.ME - A Flawed Messaging Application for Educational Purposes

### The CRY.ME project

The CRY.ME project consists in a secure messaging application based on the Matrix protocol containing many cryptographic vulnerabilities deliberately introduced for educational purposes. The CRY.ME application has been specified and developed by ANSSI and CryptoExperts to provide a practical security challenge especially targeting cryptography.

The application presents many different classes of vulnerabilities to identify and, whenever possible, to exploit. The scope of the vulnerabilities introduced in the CRY.ME covers many of the classical domains of

**About**  
CRY.ME (CRYptographic MESSAGING application)  
android challenge cryptography  
crypto ctf ctf-challenges  
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